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34 SPEEGLE tI. BOARD OF FmE UNDERWBITERS [29 C.2d 
(S. 11'. No. 17196. In Bank. Sept. 20, 1946.] 
XUM H. SPEEGLE, Appellant, v. BOARD OF FmE 
UNDERWRITERS OF THE PA.CIFIC (an Associa-
tion) et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Master and 8ervant-Oontracte of Employment-Dura.tion-
TermiDatioD.-A contract for permanent employment is only 
a contract for an indefinite period terminable at the will of 
either party, uuless it is based on some consideration other i 
than the services to be rendered, and where it is not based' I 
on such consideration a termination of the contract does not 
constitutl' a brl'ach thereof. 
[2] Interference-With Oontract Relations.-Intentional and un-
,justifiable interference with contractual relations is actionable. 
[S] Id.-With Oontract RelatioDs.-A board of ftre underwriters 
and its members arl' liable for interferencl' with an insurance 
broker's agency contracts with the board companies if their 
objective is to stifle competition by enforcing a scheme to 
restrain trade. 
[4] Pleading-Demurrer to Oomplaint-Demurrer as AdmissioD.-
On appeal from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a com-
plaint, the anegations of the complaint must be regarded as 
true. 
[6] Monopolies and Oombinations-Pleading.-In an action against 
a board of fire underwriters and its members for damages for 
inducing a breach and termination of plaintiff's insurance 
agency contracts, the complaint properly raised the question 
of defendants' liability for restraint of. trade where it alleged 
that the board was organized to stifle competition in the in-
surance field by dominating the business of insurance agents 
that defendants sought to impose certain conditions on him 
and that acceptance of those conditions would have meant 
domination of his bn!'lness bv defendant!'. 
[2] Liability for procuring breach of contract, note. 84 A.L.lL. 43. 
Sec, also, 14 Oal.Jur. 695: 30 Am.Jm. 70. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Master and Servant, § 29; [2,3] In-
terference, § 1; [4J Pleading, § 84(5): [5, 14J Monopolies and 
Combinations, § 4; [6] Pleading, §§ 39,45; [7J Pleading, § 103(3); 
fS, 9] Monopolies and Combinations, § 6; [10, 15, 16] Monopolies· 
and Combinations, § 5; {llJ Monopolies and Combinations, 11; I 
[12, 13, 17J Monopolies and Combinations, § 2. 
. ~ 
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[6] Pleading-Oonstruetion.-Pleadings must be reasonably inter-
preted; they must be read as a whole and eacb part must be 
given the mt'anin!! thnt it ileriv('!'; from the context wherein 
it appears. 
[7] Id. - Demurrer to Oomplaint - Amendment After Demurrer 
Sustained.-A plaintiff who has stated the general set of facts 
on which his cause of action is based should be given an oppor-
tunity to amend his complaint if it is defective for lack of 
particulars, and it is an abuse of discretion to sustain demur-
rers to such a complaint without leave to amend. 
[8] Monopolies and Oombinations-Oartwright Act--Oombinations 
Prohibited. - A combination between a board of ft.re under-
writers and insurance companies, which are membe1'8 of the 
board, to stifle competition in the insurance field by dominat-
ing the business of insurance agents is an unlawful trust under 
the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Coile. ~§ 16700-16758, par-
ticularly §§ 16720. 16726. 16750) 
[9] Id.-Oartwright Act-Oombinations Prohibited.-Inasmuch as 
the Cartwright Act forbids combinations of the kind described 
with respect to every type of business, it applies to combina-
tions in restraint of the insurance trade, and it is immaterial 
whether or not insuranct' is commerce. 
[10] Id. - Oartwright Act. -.,; The Cartwright Act articulates in 
greater detail a public policy against restraint of trade that. 
has long been recognized at common law. 
[11] Id. -Restraint of Trade.-Under the common law of this 
state, combinations entered into for the purpose of restrain-
ing competition and fixinf;!; prices are unlawful. 
[12] ld.-Particular Oombinations.-Combinations between insur-
ers or insurers and insurance agents for the purpose of sti1l.ing 
competition in the insurance market and fixing insurance rates 
violate the common-law rules agaimt restraint of trade. 
[13] lei. - Particular Oombinations. - The fact that a certain 
amount of t'!ooperation between insurers is required by the very 
nature of the insurance business does not exempt insurance 
companie~ from common law and statutory rules against re-
straint of trade, where the combination complained of is not 
merely between insurers but between insurers and an associa-
tion and their agents for the purpose of stifling competition. 
(14] Id.-Damages for Injuries.-One whose business has been in-
jured by the activities of a eombination in restraint of trade 
[11] See 17 Oal.Jur. 640; S6 Am.Jur. 679. 
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.. atitled to damages, not only UDder the Cartwright Act 
(Bu. " PIof. Code. f 18750), but also 1mder the eommon la". 
(Civ. Code, ,3281.) 
[16] Id.-Oartwrl,ht Act-ValiditJ.-The provisions of the Cart-
wright Aet exempting eertain eombinatiou from the operation 
of the aet (Bus. " Prof. Code, I§ 16723. 16'724) are eeparable 
from the ftBt of tht' aet, and an insuranee broker, traiDg a board 
of Ire underwriters and innranee companies, "bleb are mem-
bers of the board, for damages for indueing a breach or termi-
nation of plaintiff's insurance agency eontracts, ean recover 
iD said action irrespective of the invalidity of the foregoing 
provisions, linee the -policy against eombbiations iD· ftBtraint 
of trade underlying the statute was not ereated by it but had 
previously been evolved at eommon la". 
(18] Id.-Oartwrf,ht Act-Valiclit)r.-ln view of the fact that the 
Legislature, by addin(r a second "aragraph to Bu. " PIof. 
Code, § 18701. intended to have the entire Cartwright Aet ... 
enacted in 1907. stand should the 1909 amadment exempting 
eertain eombinations from the operation of the aet be iDvalid. 
the Cartwright Aet is eonstitutional .. ~ the objection 
that in reenactinlr the statute in 1941 the Legislature iDteuded 
that the 1907 and 1909 provisions be regarded .. iDeeparable. 
(Disapproving of Wam e. Auetiouerll A,IMI. of 80. Otil., 87 
Cal.App.2d 183. ]57 P.2d 78.,).) 
[17) Id. - Beet of Bherman Act.-The Sherman Anti-trDBt Act 
does not preclude application of the state Cartwright Aet "ith 
respect to eombinations between insurers and an aasoeiation 
of iDBuranee agents for the purpose of stUting eompetition in 
the insurance ftf'!ld. even if interstate eommeree is involved. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Mon-
terey County. Henry G. Jorgensen. Judge. Bevemed. 
Action for damages for wrongful interference with insur-
ance agency contracts. Judgment for defendants on sustain-
ing demurrers to complaint without leave to amend, reversed. 
Edward B. Solinsky, Philip C. Boardman and James 11. 
Boeeardo for Appellant. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Deputy Attorney General, and Mu Badin, u Amici Curiae 
on behalf of Appellant. 
. < 
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Joseph T. O'Connor, Long, Levit, Cunningham " White, 
Orrick, Dahlquist, Neff, Brown " Herrington and Bardin & 
Herrington for Respondents. 
O'Melveny " Myers, Louis W. Myers, Allen G. Wright, Ran-
dell Larson and Sidney L. Weinstock, 88 Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action to recover 
actual and exemplary damages for alleged injury to his busi-
ness by defendants. The trial court sustained defendants' 
demurl'ers to plaintiff's second amended complaint without 
leave to amend and entered judgment for defendants. Plain-
tiff appeals. 
The following facts are alleged in the second amended com-
plaint: Plaintiff has been an insuranee agent in Salinas sinee 
1927, and since 1937 has also done business there 88 an insur-
ance broker. He entered into written contracts of agency 
with the 14 defendant insurance companies and with defend-
ant Pennsylvania Underwriters. hereinafter referred to aa 
one of the defendant insurance companies. Defendant in-
surance companies are all members of defendant Board of Fire 
Underwriters of the Pacific, an association of 6.re insurers, 
hereinafter referred to as the board. In the early part of 1939, 
the board, acting in concert with defendant Salinas Associa-
tion of Local Insurance Ap:ents, hereinafter referred to as the 
agents' association. accused plaintiff of violating his contracts 
with the members of the board by placing insurance, 88 agent 
or as broker, with nonboard companies. Plaintift' !rtates that 
he placed most of his business with board members but that 
when the interest of his customers required it, he placed in-
surance with nonboard companies. He denies that this prac-
tice constituted a violation of his contracts with board com· 
panies. In March. 1939. following an investigation by the 
board into plaintiff'!' practices, defendants caused three of 
the board companies to terminate their agency contraets with 
him. In July of that year the board threatened to cause the 
12 other board companies to terminate their contracts with 
plaintiff, unless he immediately ceased to represent nonboard 
companies and relinquished his broker's license. Upon plain. 
tiff's refusal to comply with these conditions, defendants 
caused the termination of his remajning contracts with board 
eompaniea. 
. , 
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Plaintitr also alleges that he entered into the insurance 
agency and brokerage business in Salinas and made his con-
tracts with defendant companies in reliance upon certain 
usages of the insurance trade; that under such usages an 
agency contract is permanent and "will not be cancelled ex-
cept for good and lawful caU!'le." an agent is under no duty to 
place all insurance with the Mmpany or companies for which 
he is agent and is free to place insurance with other board 
and nonboard companies, and also is free to engage in the busi-
ness of an insurance broker and in that capacity to place 
insurance with other companies according t.o the wishes or 
interests of the applicants. 
Plaintiff further al1eges that it is the purpose of the board 
through coercion and oppressive methods, and otherwise, to \ 
dominate and control "the class of insurance written by its 
members . . . fix the terms, conditions and rates for such in-
surance," determine the terms upon which board members 
may employ agents. dominate and control the business of 
such agents and of brokers who act as agents for board mem-
bers, and by such methods to "Jimit and restrict and restrain 
fair competition in said insurance business and as between 
brokers; and ... unlawfully to create and carry out re-
straints and restrictions upon the business and business meth-
ods of such agents and brokers and upon fair competition in 
placing insurance to the best advantage of those who may 
require or who may desire insurance of the classes written 
by the ... members of said Board!' 
Plainti1l contends that defendants had no right to require 
him to represent only board companies and relinquish his 
broker's license; that their conduct amounted to an unjustified 
interference with his contractual relations and, on the part of 
defendant insurance companies. to a breach of contract; and 
that their attempt to dominate or destroy his business was 
part of a conspiracy to restrain the insurance trade in Salinas. 
The following questions are thus presented for decision: 
I. Are defendants liable for breach of contract or interference 
with plainti1l's contractual relations' II. Has plaintitr prop-
erly raised in his pleadings the question of defendants' lia-
bility for restraint of tradeT III. Has plaintiff stated a cause 
of action under statutory (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16700 to 
16758, known as the Cartwright Act) or common law roles 
against restraint of trade' IV. Is the Cartwright Act con-
stitutional' V. Does the Sherman Anti-Trust Act preclude 
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J. Are defendants liable for breach of contraet or inter-
ference with plaintifF's eontraetual relations' 
[1] The eomplaint does not set forth any of the agency 
eontracts, but pleads them aecording to their legal effect. As 
to their duration it merely alleges that in the insurance busi-
ness sueh contraets are enstomarily regarded as being perma-
nent and revocable only for cause. Plaintiff's contention that 
in terminating the contraets defendant companies committed 
breaches thereof rests therefore entirel;v upon that allegation; 
A contl'aet for permanent employment. however, is only a con-
traet for an indeflnite "eriod t.erminable at the will of either 
party (Lord v. Goldberg. 81 Cal. 596 r22 P. 1126. 15 Am.St. 
Rep. 821). unless it is based upon some consideration other 
than the services to be rendered. (BrOWfl, v. National Electric 
Works. 16~ Cal. 336 f)43 P. 6061 : DfI1lid.son v. Laughlin. 138 
Cal. 320 f71 P. 345. 5 L.R.A.N.S. !l791 : Mil1~'1ap v. National 
Funding Corp .. 57 Ca1.App.2d 772 r135 P.2d 4071: .~eiferl 
v Arnold Bros., Inc .. t38 Cal. App. 324 ra1 P.2d 10fi91 : see 
Otten v. Spreckels. 183 Cal 252 r191 P. 111.) Since plaintiff' 
has not aIJeged such consideration, it cannot be con eluded 
that defendant insurance eompanies violat.ed their eontraet8 
with him. 
Plaintift contends, however. that defendants unlawfully 
interfered with his eontracts on the grounds that none of the 
p.ontraets would have been terminated had the decisiont'eSted 
solely with each insurance company. that the termination of 
the contracts was brouJ!'ht about by pressure upon the com-
panies brought by the board. assisted by the agents' associa-
tion. and that each eompany was influenced by the othera 
acting in conoort. 
[2] Intentional and unjustifiable interference with con-
t ractual relations is actionable in California as in most other 
jurisdictions. (Imperial Ice Co. v. Bossier, 18 Ca1.2d 33 [112 
P.2d 631} ; see eases colJected in 84 A.L.R. 43.) Recognizing 
1 hat the fact that a contract is "at the will of the parties, 
l'espectively does not make it one at the will of othera," 
'Tf"U(J~ v. Raich. 239 U.S. 33. 38 r36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. t31 . 
. \nn.Cas. 1917B 283, L.R.A. 1916D 5451) the great rna· 
jority of the eases have held that unjustiflable interference 
with contracts terminable at will is actionable. (Hitchman 
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L.Ed. 260]; United Btates Pidelit" ct G'lUlrMl.t" 00. V. Mil-
Ztmas, 206 Ala. 147 [89 So. 782, 29 A.L.R. 620]; Be"" v. 
DOftOtIan, 188 Mass. 353 [74 N.E. 603, 108 Am.St.Rep. 499, 
3 Ann.Cas. 738, 5 L.R.A.N.S. 899]; LtnuJon Guarantee ct 
Ace. Co. v. Hom, 206 m. 493 [69 N.E. 526, 99 Am.St.Rep. 
185] ; see cases cited in 84 .A.L.R. 43, 60; see, also, Prosser, 
Torts, 981; 1 Callmann, Unfair Competition, § 33.1; Carpen-
ter, Inter/eref&C#J With Oontract Relation.s, 41 Harv.L.Rev. 
728, 742.) Interference with such contracts may be justified 
under certain circumstances. (Imperial Iu 00. Y. Rossier, 
18 Cal.2d 33, 36 [112 P.2d 631]; McGee v. Collins, 156 La. 
291 [100 So. 430, 34 A.L.R. 336]; TnongZe 1'.1m Corp. v. 
Artera/t Pictures Corp., 250 F. 981, 982 [163 C.C.A.231] ; 
see cases collected in 84 AL.R.79; Rest. Torts, §§ 766-774; 
Prosser, Torts, 996, 982; 1 Callmann, Unfair Competit!on, 
§ 33.1; Holmer, Privilege, Intent and Malice, 8 Harv.L.Rev. 
1, 9; Carpenter, Inter/erence With Contract Relations, 41 
Harv.L.Rev. 728, 745; 30 Am.Jur. 80.) Each company is of 
Course interested in the loyalty of its agents, and, like any 
other principal, may require an agent to represent it exclu-
sively or to represent only such other principals as have in. 
t.erests in common with it. Collective bargaining, which is an 
important part of modern employment relations, is carried 
on in recognition of the fact that employers as well as em-
ployees may organize for the purpose of furthering their 
common interests and that such organizations may bring pres-
sure upon their members to include in their contracts certain 
terms and conditions or to terminate contracts that do not 
contain such terms and conditions. (BentZe" v. Mountain, 
51 Cal.App.2d 95, 99 [124 P.2d 91]; G. B. Bmith Met. Market 
v. Lgon.s, 16 Cal.2d 389,400 [106 P.2d 414] ; Bautista v. Jones. 
25 Cal.2d 746, 749, 754, 771, 780 [155 P.2d 343] ; Parkinson 
00. Y. Bldg. Trades Oouncil, 154 Cal. 581, 603 [98 P. 1027, 
16 Ann.Cas. 1165, 21 L.R.A.N.S. 550]; E:echange Bak6f1J v. 
Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260 [157 N.E. 130, 133]; Rest., Torts, 
§§ 797-812; see Carpenter, Inter/erefI,U With Contract Bela-
tion.s, 41 Harv .L.Rev. 728, 760 and eases there cited.) It does 
not appear that the conditions sought to be imposed upon 
plaintitf were not also imposed upon the members of the 
agents' asoseiation. Such members would have a common 
interest in eeeing that he was subjected to the same conditions 
imposed upon them. 
[8] Defendants' aetivitie!l would be for an unlawful pur-
. < 
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pose, however, and would therefore not be justified, if their 
objective was to stifle competition by enforcing a scheme to 
restrain trade. (Rest., Torts, § 768(c).) The answer to the 
question whether defendants are liable for interference with 
plaintiir's contractual relations therefore depends on whether 
plaintifi' has stated a good cause of action against defendants 
for injury to his business by activities in restraint of trade. 
n. Has plaintiir properly raised in his pleadings the ques-
tion of defendants' liability for restraint of trade' 
['1 Since the case is before us on demurrer, the allegations 
of plaintiff's second amended complaint must be regarded &'''1 
true. [15] Defendants contend that although the second 
amended complaint alleges that the board was organized to 
restrain trade it fails to allege that the purpose of defendants' 
activities against plaintiir was to restrain trade or that plain-
tiir's alleged injuries resulted from activities in restraint of 
trade; Plaintiir alleged that the board was organized to "domi-
nate and control to their economie advantage, the class of 
insurance written by its members . . . fix the terms, condi-
tions and rates for such insurance . . . likewise dominate and 
control the business and business methods of said agents and 
of every independent insurance broker who may be acting as 
an insurance agent for any member • • . of said Board, and 
by and through such coercion, oppression, domination and 
control limit and restrict and restrain fair competition in said 
insurance busines.<! and as between brokers . . . and by such 
coercion and oppression in respect to and domination and con-
trol of the classes of insurance written by its members . . . 
unlawfully to create and carry out restraints and restrictions 
upon the business . . . of such agents and brokers and upon 
fair eompetion in placing insurance to the best advantage of 
those who may require . . . insurance of the classes written 
by said members of said Board." Plaintiir's allegation that 
the board was organized to stifle competition in the insurance 
fleld by dominating the business of insurance agents must be 
read in conjunction with his allegations as to the conditions 
that defendants sought to impose upon him and his allegation 
that acceptance of those conditions would have meant domina-
tion of his business by defendants. If these allegations are 
read in conjunction with each other it cannot be seriously 
questioned that plaintiir's second amended complaint alleged 
that it was defendants' purpose not merely to injure plain-
tUf'. business, but to dominate that bllSiness along with the 
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business of other insurance agents and brokers and thus to 
restrain trade in the field of insurance written by board com-
panies. In the light of the facts alleged it is clear that plaintiff 
traced the injuries inflicted upon his business to his refusal 
to accept domination of his business by defendants as part of 
a general scheme pursued by them to restrain trade in the 
insurance field by dominating the busine.'!S of insurance agents. 
[6] Pleadings mum be reasonably interpreted; they must be 
read as a whole and each part must be given the meaning 
that it derives from the context wherein it appears. (Jones 
v. Keny, 208 Cal. 251 £280 P. 9421; Ha.yter v. li'ulmor, 66 
Ca1.App.2d 554, 561 [152 P.2d 746].) "Allegations must be 
liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice be-
tween the parties." (Code Civ. Proe., § 452). which il; not 
served when technical forfeitures prevent a trial on the 
merits. (Wennerholm v. StanfordUniv. Seh. of Med., 20 
Ca1.2d 713 [128 P.2d 522. 141 A.L.R. 1358].) 
[7] Even if the trial court was of the opinion that plain-
tiff's second amended complaint was not sufticiently detailed, 
it abused its discretion in sustaining defendants' demurrers 
without leave to amend. for a plaintiff who bas pleaded the 
general set of facts upon which his cause of aetion is based 
should be given an· opportunity. to amend his complaint, and 
should not be deprived of his right to maintain his action on 
the ground that his pleadings were defective for lack of par-
ticulars. (Code of Civ. Proe., § 472(c); Olivera v. Grace, 19 
Cal.2d 570, 579 [122 P.2d 564, 140 A.L.R. 1328]; MacIsaac 
v. Pozzo, 26 Ca1.2d 809, 815 [161 P.2d 449]; WennerhoZm v. 
Stanford Univ. Seh. of Med., 20 Cal.2d 713, 719 [128 P.2d 
522, 141 A.L.R. 1358]; Guilliams v. Hollywood Hospita.l, 18 
Cal.2d 97, 104 [114 P.2d 1].) 
It must be concluded, therefore, that plaintiff's second 
amended complaint properly raised the question of defend-
ants' liability for restraint of trade. 
m. Has plaintiff stated a cause of action under statu-
tory or common law rules against restraint of trade' 
The Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16700-16758) 
forbids combinations in restraint of trade and grants a cause 
of action to any person injured by such a combination. Under 
section 16726, trusts, as defined in section 16720, are "unlaw-
ful, against public policy and void." Under section 16750 an~' 
person whose business is injured by such a trust "JIla1 sue 
) 
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therefor . • • to recover twofold the damages sustained b7 
him, and the costs of suit."· 
[8] It cannot be seriously questioned that a combination 
like the one alleged to have existed between defendants is an 
unlawful trust under the foregoing proyisions. [9] Defend-
ants contend, however, that insurance is not eommerce or at 
least was not 80 regarded when the Cartwright Act was en-
acted, and that therefore the act does not apply to combina-
tions in restraint of the insuranee trade. It is true that the 
decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Asso-
ciation, 322 U.S. 533 [64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440J, in which 
the United States Supreme Court recently detennined that 
insurance is commerce within the meaning of the Commerce 
Clause and the Shennan Anti-Trust Act could not change the 
meaning of the word "commerce" as that word is used in the 
Cartwright Act. It demonstrates, however, that Congress did 
not intend "to freeze the proscription of the Sherman Act 
within the mold of the then current judicial decisions defining 
the commerce power," but intended on the contrary to go to 
the utmost extent of its power~ The Cartwright Act is couched 
in similarly comprehensive language; it forbids combinations 
of the kind deRerlbed with respect to every type of busineR!!. 
• A trust is defined in aeetion 16120 as a "combination of capital, skill 
or acts by two or more per80ns for any of the following purposes: 
(a) To Qeate or carry out restrictions in trade or oommeree. 
(b) To limit or reduce the production. 01' inerease the priee of merehan· 
dise or of any commodity. 
(c) To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, 
sale or purchase of merebandiae, produee or any commodity. 
(d) To fix at an., standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or 
consumer shall be m any manner controlled or established, any article or 
commodity of merchandise, produce I'lr commerce intended for sale. barter, 
l18e or consumption in this State. 
(e) To make or ~nter into or execute or carry out any contr&ets! obliga-
tions or agreements of any kind or description. by whieb they (10 all 01' 
Any combination of any of the following: 
(1) Bind themselves not to sell, dispose of or transport any article or 
any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise! commerce or 
consumption below a eorumOll standard figure, or Axed 1'8 ue. 
(2) Agree m lUIy manner to keep the price of such article, commodity 
01' transportation Ht a filled or graduated figure. 
(3) Estllblish or settlt' the price of any article, commodity or trans-
portation betwt'Cn them or themselves and others1 80 as directly or indi-
rectly to preclude a free and unrestricted competltion among themselves, 
or any purchAsers or "Onl'l1meJ'l! in tbp !!Inte or tmnsportntion of any 1IU('11 
article or commodity. 
(4) Agree t.o (11'01. combme or directly or indirectly unite any interest.s 
that they may have connected with the sale or transportation of any sueh 
article or commodity, that its price might in an)' manner be atIeeted." 
" SPEEGLE tI. BOARD OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS {29 C.2d 
It cannot be asswned, therefore, that the Legislature in-
tended to make an exception for insurance in the absence 
of any indication in the statute to that effect. Moreover, 
it is immaterial whether or not insurance is commerce, for 
the Act makes unlawful combinations designed to increase 
the price of "any commodity" and to fix the price of "any 
article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, mer-
chandise, commerce or consumption." It is clear that in-
surance, being "practically a necessity to business activity 
and enterprise" (German AUiance Ins. 00. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 
389, 414 (34 s.Ot. 612, 58 L.Ed. 1011]) has become an in-
dispensable commodity in modern life. 
[10] The Cartwright Act merely articulates in greater de-
tail a public policy against restraint of trade that has long been 
recognized at common law. [11] Thus, under the common 
law of this state combinations entered into for the purpose of 
restraining competition and fixing prices are unlawful. (Getz 
Bros. ct 00. v. Federal Salt 00., 147 Cal. 115, 118 [81 P.416. 
109 Am.St.Rep. 114J; Meyer. v. Merillion, 118 Cal. 352, 356 
(50 P. 662] : Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 726 [16 P.2<l I 
673J; Herriman v. Menzie., 115 Cal. 16, 21 [44 P. 660, 46 
P. 730, 56 Am.St.Rep. 82, 35 L.R.A. 318J; Santa Clara Valley 
Mill ct Lumber 00. v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387. 393 [18 P. 391, 
9 Am.St.Rep. 211]; Pacific Factor 00. v. Adler, 90 Cal. 110 
[27 P. 36, 25 Am.St.Rep. 102]; see, 36 Am.Jur. 579.) The 
public interest requires free competition 80 that prices be not 
dependent upon an understanding among suppliers of any 
given commodity, but upon the interplay of the economic 
forces of supply and demand. [12] Combinations between 
insurers or insurers and insurance agents for the purpose of 
stifling competition in the insurance market and fixing insur-
ance rates are clearly in violation of the common law rules 
against restraint of trade. (Aetna Ins. 00. v. Oommonwealth. 
106 Ky. 864 [51 S.W. 624, 45 L.R.A. 355]; McOarter v. Fire-
men's Ins. 00., 74 N.J.Eq. 372 [73 A. 80. 414, 135 Am.St.Rep. 
708, 18 Ann.Cas. 1048, 29 L.R.A.N.S. 1194].) Insurance is 
a matter of such public concern that many states regard the 
protection afforded the community by statutory or common 
law rules against restraint of tnde as insufficient and have 
accordingly enacted special statutes against combinations that 
seek to dominate the field of insurance or have given their 
insurance commissioners special powers over insurance rates. 
The enactment of such special legislation signifies there is a 
) 
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danger of market domination in the insurance field, in which 
a great number of diversified risks and the accumulation of 
vast reserves are required of each insurer. "Fire insuranee 
companies, acting together, may have owners of property 
practieally at their mercy in the matter of rates, and may have 
it in their power to deprive the public generally of the ad. 
vantages flowing from competition between rival organiza· 
tions engaged in the business of fire insurance. In order to 
meet the evils of such combinations and associations,· the State 
is competent to adopt appropriate regulations that will tend 
to substitute competition in the plaee of combination or 
monopoly." (Germo,n Alliance 1M. CD. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 
307,316 [31 S.Ct. 246, 55 L.Ed. 229].) Since there is no sueb 
special legislation in California, the Cartwright Act and the 
common law must be relied upon for the protection of the 
public against combinations in restraint of the insurance trade. 
[18] Courts have recognized that a certain amount of eo-
operation between insurers is required by the very nature of 
the insurance business. (Continental 1M. CD. v. Boa,rd of 'ire 
Underwriter, of tke Pacific, 67 F. 310; Booker ct Kinncird v. 
Louis1n7k Boa,rd of F'ire Underwrifer., 188 Ky. 771 [224 S.W. 
451, 454, 21 A.L.R. 531]; see Cline v. Insurance Ettchange of 
Houston, 140 Tex. 175 [166 S.W.2d 677]; Cline v. Insurance 
Euhange of Houston (Tex.Civ.App.) 154 S.W.2d 491, 495; 
Buffalo AsB'n of F'ire Underwriter. v. No%Sel-Dimick CD., 
235 App.Div. 92 [256 N.Y.S. 263], aff'd, 260 N.Y. 678 [184 
N.E. 142]; Walker v. 70rt Worth 1M. UfUlerwriter.' AsB'n 
(Tex.Civ.App.) 79 S.W.2d 661.) It does not follow foot in· 
surance companies are immune from common law and statu· 
tory rules against restraint of trade. The combination com-
plained of in the present case was not merely between in-
surers but between insurers and an association of their agents; 
combinations between employers and employees present a 
partieularly deetive means of stifling competition. The United 
States Supreme Court has recently deelared that "Congress 
never intended that unions could, consistently with the Sher-
man Act, aid non-labor groups to create business monopolies 
and to control the marketing of goods and services." (Allen 
Braille" Co. v. Local U"ion No.8, 325 U.S. 797, 808 [65 S.Ot. 
1533, 89 L.E<l. 1939]; see, United 8tate. v. Borden Co.; 308 
U.S. 188, 204 (60 aCt. l82, 84 L.Ed. 181); 19 So. Cal. 
L.Bev. 256.). 
./ 
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It must be concluded, therefore, that plaintiff has stated 
a cause of action not only under common law rules but 
under the Cartwright Act. 
[14] If the trial court should determine that plaintiff's 
business was injured by activities in restraint of trade, the 
question will arise as to how plaintiff's damages should be com· 
puted. One whose business has been injured by the activities 
of a combination in restraint of trade is entitled to damages. 
not only under the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 16750), but also under the common law. (Civ. Code, § 3281, 
see, eases cited in 36 Am.Jur. 660, n. 9.) Since proof of the 
damages suffered may be difficult. "the wrongdoer may not 
object to the plainti1l"s reasonable estimate of the cause of the 
injury and of its amount, supported by the evidence, because 
not based on more accurate data which the wrongdoer's mis-
conduct has rendered una,railable." (Bigelow v. RKO llculio 
Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (66 S.Ot. 574, 580, 90 L.Ed. 
652].) "The most elementary conceptions of justice and pub-
lie policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of 
the uncertainty which his own wrong has created. • • • That 
principle is an ancient one • . . and is not restricted to proof 
of damage in antitrust suits, although their character is such 
as frequently to call for its application." (Ibid.) 
IV. Is the Cartwright Act constitutional' 
[15] Defendants contend that the Cartwright Act is un-
constitutional. It was 80 held in Ward v. Auctioneers An'n 
of 80. Cal., 67 Cal.App.2d 183 f153 P.2d 765]; and Blake v. 
Paramount Pictures, 22 F.Supp. 249, on the authority of 
Cline v. Prink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 [47 S.Ot. 681, 71 L.Ed. 
1146]. In the latter ease the Supreme Court of the United 
States enjoined the prosecution of several dairy companies 
under the Colorado Anti-Trust Act, a statute "which is in 
terms a replica of the Cartwright Act," (In f'e Battelle, 207 
Cal. 227, 251 [277 P. 725, 65 A.L.R. 1497]) on the ground 
that the provisions therein exempting from its operation com-
binations entered into for the purpose of eecmring reasonable 
profits to their members, provided such profits eould Dot 
otherwise be secured, left the whole statute "without a fixed 
standard of guilt" and thus rendered it unconstitutional. 
Although the court did not expressly hold those provisions to 
be inseparable, it must have regarded them as such in the 
absence of any decision on the subject by the Supreme Court 
of Colorado, for it indicated that the statute would have been 
ftlid without them. Plainti1l' contends, however, that the eor-
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responding provisions of the Cartwright Act (B118 & Prof . 
. Code, §§ 16723 and 16724) are separable from the rest of 
the act and that he can recover in the present action irre-
spective of their invalidity. That contention must be sustained. 
The policy against combinations in restraint of trade under-
lying the Cartwright Act was not created by that act but had 
previously been evolved at common law. The act was not in-
tended to change that policy but merely to make itA enforce-
ment more effective. It is clear therefore not only that the 
provisions exempting certain combinations from the operation 
of the act do not have the same importance a."I the provisions 
prohibiting all other combinations in restraint of trade. but 
also that the act will remain fully inte11igible and will effec· 
tively serve the purpose for which it was enacted. even though 
the former provisions are disregarded. Moreover. there i..'1 
another consideration that leads 118 to separate the exceptions 
from the general prohibition. The Cartwright Act. as enacted 
in 1907, did not include the provision!! that rendered the 
Colorado act unconstitutional, for those provisions were added 
in 1909. In the Colorado act, however. they were part of the 
original enactment. Th118. the fact that tbe Supreme Court of 
the United States took the position that the invalid provision!l 
were so essential to that mtute that it would not have been en-
acted without them can have no bearing upon the present case, 
for in the present ease the statute was originally enacted with-
out the allegedly invalid provisions. The very court that de-
cided against separability in Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., supra. 
would undoubtedly decide in favor of separability in the pres-
ent case on the authority of Frost v. Corporation Commission. 
278 U.S. 515 [49 S.Ct. 235. 73 L.Ed. 483). In that case an 
unconstitutional amendment to a statute of Oklahoma was held 
separable from the valid provisions sought to be amended. 
although the court expressly mated that the amendment would 
have invalidated the original enactment had it been part of 
that enactment. "When passed. it (the original statute) ex-
pressed the will of the legislature which enacted it. Without 
an express repeal. a different legislature undertook to create 
an exception, but. since that body sought to express its will by 
an amendment which, being un('onstitutional, is a nullity and. 
therefore, powerless to work any change in the existing statute. 
that statute must stand a.q the only valid expression of the 
legislative intent." (Prost v. Corporation Commission, supra, 
at p. 526.) The same position was taken by this court (M,"ller 
Y. Union Beank ct Trust Co., 7. Ca1.2d 31 [59 P.2d 1024]) and 
) 
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is sastained by the overwhelming weight of authority. (See 
eases collected In 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 
(3d ed.) § 1937.} 
[18] Defendants contend, however, that when the Legis-
lature in 1941 reenacted the Cartwright Act, as amended in 
1909, into the Business and Professions Code, it intended that 
the entire statute be regarded as having been enacted at the 
same time. It need not be determined whether in that event 
the 1909 provisions would be inseparable from the 1907 provi-
sions, for plaintUf'8 cause of action arose in 1939 and the act 
must be construed as it stood at that time. Moreover, far from 
expressing the intention suggested by defendants, the Legisla-
ture made it clear that the 1907 and 1909 provisions should 
continue to be regarded as separable. Not only does section 
2 of the Business and Professions Code specify that the provi-
sions of that code should be construed as restatements and 
continuations of similar provisions of existing statutes rather 
than as new enactments, but section 16701 provides that the 
separability of the provisions of the Cartwright Act should be 
determined by "whether the provisions of • • . 1907 and the 
provisions of • • . 1909 are separable among themselves and 
88 to each other." The 1909 amendment added four provisions 
to and deleted two words from the original enactment. In 
order to make it absolutely clear that if the 1909 amendment 
were invalid, the entire 1907 enactment should stand, the 
Legislature added a second paragraph to section 16701 in 
which it specified that, if the two words that it attempted to 
delete in 1909 were not effectively deleted, it intended them to 
be part of the act. Defendants point to the dUferenee between 
section 16701(1) and section 16701(2) and contend that if the 
Legislature intended to have the entire 1907 enactment stand 
should the 1909 amendment be invalid, it would have said 80 
expressly as it did in section 16701 (2) as to the two deleted 
words. Section 16701(2), however, was enacted as a precau-
tion to cover two words that do not appear in the text of the 
amended statute and no similar precaution was needed as to 
the rest, for, with the exception of those two words, the 
amended statute includes both the original provisions and 
those added in 1909. It must be concluded, therefore, that the 
Cartwright Act is constitutional. Ward v. Aucfiotl.eers Ass'" 
of 80. Cal., supra, 67 Cal.App.2d 183, is therefore disapproved. 
V. Does the Sherman Anti-Trust Act preclude the appli-
eation of state law t 
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[17] When plaintiH filed his second amended complaint 
the United States Supreme Court had not yet rendered ita 
decision in United Statel v. South-Eastern Underwriters' A8-
,ociation, 322 U.S. 533 [64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440), that 
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act applies to interstate insurance 
transactions. PlaintiH has made no allegations as to whether 
or not any of the parties was engaged in interstate commerce 
or whether defendants' alleged activities in restraint of trade 
affected interstate commerce. Upon the trial of the ease it 
may appear that the ease involves interstate commerce and 
the question would then arise whether plaintiH can sue under 
the state law and in a state court or whether his exclusive 
:remedy is under the Sherman Act and in the federal courts. 
Although the South-Eastern ease brought <fa reorientation 
of attitudes toward federal power in its relation to the business 
of insurance conducted across state lines" (Pnulenfiallns. Co. 
v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 [66 S.Ct.1142. 1147, 90 L.Ed. 1342, 
164 A.L.R. 4761), the United States Supreme Court made it 
clear that this reorientation did not mean that the states were 
deprived of jurisdiction to regulate insurance. "It is settled 
that. for Constitutional purposes, certain activities of a busi-
ness may be intrastate and therefore subject to state control. 
while other activities of the same business may be interstate 
and therefort> subject t.() federal regulation. And there is a 
wide range of business and other activities which, though sub-
ject to federal regulation, are so intimately related to local wel-
fare that, in the absence of Congre..qsional action, they may be 
regulated or taxed by the states. In marking out these activi-
ties the primary test applied by the Court is not the mechanical 
one of whether the particular activity affected by the state 
regulation is part of interstate commerce, but rather whether, 
in each case. the competing demands of the state and national 
interest.s; involved can be accommodated. And the fact that 
particular phases of an interstate business or activity have 
long been regulated or taxed by states has been recognized as 
a Rtrong reason why, in the continued absence of con1licting 
Congressional action. the Rtate regulatory and tax laws should 
be declared valid .... Finally it is argued ••• that virtually 
all the states regulate the insurance business on the theory 
that competition in the field of insurance is detrimental both 
to the insurers and the insured. and that if the Sherman Act 
~ held applicable to insurance much of this state regulation 
1Vi1l be destroyed. ••• The argument that the Sherman Act 
\ 
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necessarily invalidates many state laws regulating insurance 
we regard as exaggerated. Few states go 80 far as to permit 
private insurance companies, without state supervision, to 
agree upon and fix uniform insurance rates. Cf. Parker v. 
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350·352 [63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315]. 
No states authorize combinations of insurance companies to 
coerce, intimidate, and boycott competitors and consumers in 
the manner here alleged, and it cannot be that any companies 
have acquired a vested right to engage in such destructive 
business practices." (United States v. South-Eastertt Under-
writers' AS30ciation, supra, pp. 548, 549, 562.) The view that 
the Soutt. Eastern Underwriters case does not invalidate state 
laws jn the insurance field in absence of conflicting action by 
Congress was retiterated in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Ben-
jamin, supra, and Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 [66 
S.Ot. 1160, 90 L.Ed. 1366]. As stated in the Prudential 
ease: "State laws are not invalid under the Commerce Clause 
unless they actually discriminate against interstate commerce 
or conflict with a regulation enacted by Congress." (66 S.Ct. 
1142, 1150, note 22.) In order to "give support to the exist-
ing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the 
business of insurance" (Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 
supra, 66 S.Ot. 1142, 1155) Congress enacted the McCarran 
Act. (59 St318. 34, c. 20; 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011-]015.)· 
·SectIOn 1011. "UocgrbSl; declares tllat tile con~illn~ti regulation nnd 
taxation by the several States of the business of insurant'e is in the publj~ 
interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed 
to iInpose any barrier to the re{rUlation OT l:1~::ltioll of Much business by 
the several States." 
Section 1012. .• (a) The busmess of insurauee, awl eve)'y person en-
gaged therein, sh&ll be subject to the laws of the several States which 
relate to the regulation or taxation of such business. 
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, iInpair, or 
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the 
business of insurance, OT which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, 
unless such Act speci1ically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, 
That after January 1, 1948, sections 1-7 of this title, and sections 12-27, 
44 of this title, section 412 of Title 18, eeetions 381·383, 386·390a of 
Title 28, and ~tions 52 and 53 of Title 29, and aeetions 41-46 and 47·58 
of this title, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insuran(!.(1 
to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law." 
Section 1013. "(a) Until January 1, 1948, sections 1-7 of this title 
and sectiODl! 12·27,44 of this title, aeetion 412 of Title 18, sections 381-
383, 386-390a of Title 28, and aeetions 52 and 53 of Title 29, and sections 
41-46 and 47·58 of this title and aeetions IS-lSb, and 21a of this title, 
ahall not apply to tbf' business of inmrance or to acts in the conduct 
thereof. 
(b) Nothing contained in this ehapter llhall render sections 1·7 of this 
title, inapplicable to any agreement to boyeott, ooeree, or intimidate, or 
_ of boycott, coerl'ion or intimidation." 
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This act clearly recognizes the interest of the states in the 
regulation of insurance. "The McCarran Act, is, in effect, a 
detennination by Congress that the business of insurance, 
though done in interstate commerce is not of such a character 
as to require unifonnity of treatment within the distinction 
taken in the doctrine of Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 How. 
(U.S.) 299 [13 L.Ed. 996], except as othenvise expressly de-
clared.·' (Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, supra, p. 1156, 
note 39.) In order to allow time for Congre.'is and the state 
Legislatures to consider legislation with regard to activities in 
restraint of trade in the field of insurance. the applicability 
of the Shennan Antitrust Act and other pertinent federal 
statutes is suspended by the act until January 1, 1948. (H. 
Rep. No. 143, 79th Congo (1st Sess.), p. 3.) While this sus-
pension makes it clear that in the meantime state law applies 
to restrictions upon competition in the insurance trade, the 
Sherman Act remains applicable with respect to restraints of 
competition involving boycott. coercion, or intimidation. The 
fact that the Shennan Act is applicable to such practices does 
not mean that the state Jaw concerning restraints of commerce 
in the insurance trade ill invalidated aR to activities and agree-
ments involving such practiCeR. The key to an understanding 
of the provision of the MeCarran Act reserving the applica-
bility of the Shennan Act with regard to the praetices referred 
to lies in the statement of the United States Supreme Court 
in the South-Eastern Underwriters case that no state author-
izeR combinations of insurance companies to coerce, intimidate 
or boycott competitors and consumers. By declaring the Sher-
man Act applicable to such practices the McCarran Act pre-
vents the states during the moratorium from authorizing such 
practices in conflict with the Sherman Act. Since there is no 
conflict between the law of this state and the Sherman Act, 
plaintiff may invoke the state law even if interstate com-
merce is involved. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Peters, J. t pro tern., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied Octo-
ber 17, 1946. Shenk, J .. voted for a rehee.ring. 
